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China’s “Three Warfares”:
People’s Liberation Army Influence Operations
EDWIN S. COCHRAN*
Abstract
This article examines the role of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the conduct of Chinese
influence operations, a broad range of non-kinetic, communications-related, and informational
activities that aim to affect cognitive, psychological, motivational, ideational, ideological, and
moral characteristics of a target audience. China conducts influence operations on a global scale
as part of a grand strategy that seeks China’s “rejuvenation” as a great power and the PLA is a
key executor. PLA influence operations are encapsulated in the “Three Warfares” concept of
media (or public opinion) warfare, psychological warfare, and legal ware. Media warfare is
essentially the control and exploitation of communications channels for the dissemination of
propaganda and sets the conditions for dominating communications channels for the conduct of
psychological and legal warfare. Psychological warfare disrupts an adversary’s decision-making
and ability to conduct military operations through perception management and deception. Legal
warfare uses domestic and international law to claim the “legal high ground” to assert Chinese
interests. PLA organizations responsible for information operations include the Central Military
Commission (particularly the Joint Staff Branch and its Intelligence Bureau, the Political Work
Division Liaison Branch, and the Office for International Military Cooperation), the Strategic
Support Force, and PLA-controlled media enterprises.
Keywords: China; People’s Liberation Army; Three Warfares; media warfare; public opinion
warfare; propaganda; psychological warfare; legal warfare; information operations; political
warfare
Influence operations include a broad range of “non-kinetic, communications-related, and
informational activities that aim to affect cognitive, psychological, motivational, ideational,
ideological, and moral characteristics of a target audience.”1 China conducts influence operations

* The author is a retired U.S. Army officer and a retired civilian employee of the U.S. Department of Defense. He
holds an MS in Strategic Intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College (now National Intelligence
University), and an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. His published
work has appeared in The Journal of Strategic Studies, Israel Affairs, Parameters, and The International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
1

Eric V. Larson et al., Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 3;
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG654.sum.pdf, accessed August 20,
2020. The authors note that the U.S. lacks a formal, official definition of influence operations.
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on a global scale and through a wide range of actors as part of a grand strategy that seeks China’s
“rejuvenation” as a great power.2 As a key executor,3 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)4
conducts influence operations through its “Three Warfares” concept of media warfare,
psychological warfare, and legal warfare.
This article examines the role of the PLA in Chinese influence operations. First, it
describes and discusses the constituent elements of the “Three Warfares.” Next, it discusses
influence operations in the dual contexts of information operations and political warfare. It then
describes the PLA’s organizational structure for the execution of influence operations and,
finally, draws a series of conclusions concerning PLA influence operations and identifies areas
for further research.
The “Three Warfares”
The 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States characterized China as a
“revisionist power” engaged in long-term strategic competition with the U.S. and its allies. “It is
increasingly clear that…China [wants] to shape a world consistent with [its] authoritarian model
– gaining veto power over other nation’s economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.” China

2

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: 2019), 112; https://news.usni.org/2019/05/03/2019‐pentagon‐report‐
to‐congress‐on‐chinese‐military‐development; accessed August 27 2020; Defense Intelligence Agency, China
Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win (Washington, DC: 2019), 6;
https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FIN
AL_5MB_20190103.pdf, accessed August 27, 2020.
3

Other influence operations executors include the United Work Front Department, the Propaganda Ministry, and
the Ministry of State Security. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, 112.
4

The PLA includes all of China’s armed forces and consists of the PLA Army (PLAA), the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLAN
Marine Corps (PLANMC), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), the PLA Strategic Support Force
(SSF), and the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF).
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pursues a long-term strategy to assert power through a combination of military modernization
initiatives, predatory and coercive economic measures, and influence operations.5
Influence connotes an attempt to change the beliefs or behaviors of others through
persuasion, and influence operations have a long history in Chinese strategic thought. China has
“a lengthy heritage of conceiving and implementing systematic programs” – to include the
manipulation of information – “for subverting other states.”6 This deep historical experience
continues to serve China’s leaders. From the very beginning of the Chinese Revolution, Mao
Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sought to exploit foreign contacts and
audiences to shape the story of the revolution, gain support, and discredit their adversaries.7
The contemporary version of Chinese influence operations emerged in 2003 when the
CCP Central Committee and the Central Military Commission approved the concept of the
“Three Warfares” in the revised “Chinese People’s Liberation Army Political Work
Regulations.” The “Three Warfares” (san zhong zhanfa or san zhan ) concept is a dynamic,
nuanced strategic approach to influence operations consisting of three interrelated elements: (1)
media warfare (yulun zhan); (2) psychological warfare (xinli zhan); and (3) legal warfare (falü
zhan). The purpose of the “Three Warfares” is to establish “discursive power” (huayu quan) over

5

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of
America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: 2018), 2;
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018‐National‐Defense‐Strategy‐Summary.pdf;
accessed August 27, 2020.
6

Ralph D. Sawyer, The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China (New York, NY: Basic
Books, 2007), 383.

7

Peter Mattis, “Contrasting China’s and Russia’s Influence Operations,” War on the Rocks, January 12, 2018;
https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/contrasting‐chinas‐russias‐influence‐operations/;
accessed May 11, 2020.
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an adversary – the power to control perceptions and shape narratives that serve Chinese interests,
while undermining those of an opponent. 8
MEDIA WARFARE
Media warfare (also known as public opinion warfare) is aimed at influencing public
opinions and attitudes to build support for Chinese political and military actions and dissuade an
adversary from pursuing actions contrary to China’s interests. Media warfare leverages all
information-related capabilities that inform or influence public opinion, to include films,
television programs, books, the internet, and the global media network. The goals of media
warfare are to preserve friendly morale, generate public support at home and abroad, and to
weaken an enemy’s will to fight. 9
Media warfare is essentially the control and exploitation of communications channels for
the dissemination of propaganda, the presentation of “written, visual, or oral information that
attempts to influence, manipulate, or direct the attitudes of [foreign or domestic target
audiences].10 Propaganda may be characterized as white, gray, or black. White propaganda is
true information intended to mislead or deceive. Gray propaganda may be partially false or
partially true. Black propaganda is wholly false. While white propaganda may be attributable to

8

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Net Assessment, China: The Three Warfares (Washington, DC: 2013),
28; https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Other/Litigation%20Release%20‐
%20China‐%20The%20Three%20Warfares%20%20201305.pdf; accessed May 12, 2020; Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Annual Report to Congress, 112; John Costello and Joe McReynolds, China’s Strategic Support Force: A
Force for a New Era, China Strategic Perspectives 13 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2018),
28; https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/china‐perspectives_13.pdf, accessed
August 26, 2020.
9

Office of the Secretary of Defense, China: The Three Warfares, 28; 30‐31.

10

Leo D. Carl, The International Dictionary of Intelligence (McLean, VA: International Defense Consultant Services,
Inc., 1990), 6.
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its source, black and gray propaganda are non-attributable. 11 Information in all forms can be
propaganda if it has hostile political intent.12 Media warfare is the cornerstone of the “Three
Warfares” in that it sets the conditions for dominating communications channels for the conduct
of psychological and legal warfare.13
Chinese propaganda targets both external and internal audiences by casting the CCP as
the sole legitimate inheritor of China’s long history and traditional culture (particularly vis-à-vis
Taiwan), and through positive and selective presentation of Party policies and principles. General
propaganda themes emphasize CCP political, economic, technological, military, and cultural
achievements to present an image of political stability, prosperity, internal harmony, and military
strength. Particularly for external audiences, CCP propaganda presents China as a country with a
long history of “friendship with peace loving people throughout the world” and whose leaders
are worthy of trust.14
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
The PLA Academy of Military Sciences defines of the goal of psychological warfare as
“to influence, constrain, and / or alter an opponent’ s thoughts, emotions, and habits while at the
same time strengthening friendly psychology.”15 Psychological warfare is aimed at disrupting an

11

Ibid, 6; Angelo M. Codevilla, “Political Warfare,” in Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking
the US Approach, ed. Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989),
79‐85.
12

Paul A. Smith, Jr., On Political War (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989), 7.

13

Office of the Secretary of Defense, China: The Three Warfares, 28; 30‐31.

14

Mark A. Stokes, The PLA General Staff Department Third Department Second Bureau: An Organizational
Overview of Unit 61398, Project 2049 Institute, July 27, 2015, 16; https://project2049.net/2015/07/27/the‐pla‐
general‐staff‐department‐third‐department‐second‐bureau‐an‐organizational‐overview‐of‐unit‐61398/, accessed
August 26, 2020.
15

Academy of Military Science, Operations Theory and Regulations Research Department and Informatinalized
Operations Theory Research Office, Informationalized Operations Theory Study Guide (Beijing, PRC: Academy of
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adversary’s decision-making apparatus and undermining and enemy’s ability to conduct military
operations by shocking and demoralizing enemy military personnel and their supporting civilian
populations. Psychological warfare operations seek to create doubts, foment anti-leadership
sentiments, and to alter or shape adversary government or popular perceptions through
deception.16
PLA doctrine identifies five broad psychological warfare tasks:17
(1) To present one’s own position in any dispute as being “just” in order to achieve
political mobilization and support among domestic and foreign audiences.
(2) Emphasizing one’s advantages, particularly in terms of military capabilities, both to
bolster confidence and will on one’s own side while simultaneously influencing adversary and
neutral perceptions.
(3) Undermining an adversary’s will to resist by degrading morale and unravelling
alliances and support from third parties.
(4) Undermining cohesion among an adversary’s population by sparking dissension,
fostering anti-war elements, and encouraging a feeling of war weariness.
(5) Implementing psychological defenses through counter - propaganda and publicizing
“enemy machinations and techniques” to “expose and highlight their futility.”

Military Science Press, 2003), 404, cited in Dean Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological
Warfare Challenge,” Backgrounder No. 2821, Heritage Foundation, July 12, 2013, 2;
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2013/pdf/bg2821.pdf, accessed August 21, 2020.
16

Office of the Secretary of Defense, China: The Three Warfares, 28‐29.

17

Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge,” 2.

6
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In addition to the five psychological warfare tasks, PLA analysts have developed a
typology of psychological warfare consisting of coercive, deceptive, alienating, and defense
psychological warfare.18
Coercive Psychological Warfare
Coercive psychological warfare represents a combined application of the informational
and military components of national power to achieve a cognitive effect. Coercive psychological
warfare is “aimed as causing an opponent to surrender or otherwise abandon a fight by
leveraging his emotions, and / or will and persuading him that resistance if futile.” Examples of
coercive psychological warfare include displays of military capability, weapons tests, and
military exercises, combined with the insinuation or overt threat of violence to degrade an
adversary’s willingness to resist.
Deceptive Psychological Warfare
PLA tradition emphasizes deception and psychological manipulation to create
asymmetric advantages and achieve surprise.19 Deception refers to efforts taken to cause an
adversary to believe something that is not true, with the goal of causing him to react in a manner
that serves the deceiver’s advantage.20 The fundamental purpose of deception is “to manipulate
the perceptions of the target’s decision makers in order to gain a competitive advantage.”21

18

Ci Weixu, ed., 100 Questions About Psychological Warfare (Beijing, PRC: Liberation Army Press, 2004), esp. 1‐2,
103‐104, 236‐237, 302‐303, cited in Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare
Challenge,” 6‐8.
19

Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, 47.

20

Abram Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” in Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty‐
First Century Challenge, ed. Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center,
2002), 15.
21

Michael I. Handel, War, Strategy, and Intelligence (London, UK: Frank Cass, 1989), 310.
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Deceptive psychological warfare employs “stratagems and other deceptive measures to implant
psychological and other informative barriers in the cognitive process[es] of opponents” and
complicates decision making by making it harder to distinguish true from false information.
Successful deception depends upon the distortion, manipulation, or fabrication of
evidence to induce an adversary to react in a way prejudicial to his own interests.22 Manipulation
refers to the use of true or factual data in such a way as to create a false impression. Fabrication
refers to the creation of false information or images to mislead an adversary concerning the
deceiver’s true intentions or capabilities.23
Alienation Psychological Warfare
Alienation psychological warfare aims to generate “dissension and discord” among an
opponent’s population and government, “creating friction and fracturing links between the
population and the leadership, among leaders and between allies, and between the military and
civil population.”
Defensive Psychological Warfare
Defensive psychological warfare intentionally targets an internal audience, seeking to
“immunize” the country’s leaders and population against adversary messaging efforts. Defensive
psychological warfare measures include shaping public opinion through control of the media, as
well as strict enforcement of laws dealing with the dissemination or receipt of information from
foreign sources. Defensive psychological warfare seeks to create and strengthen a broad

22

Michael Bennett and Edward Waltz, Counterdeception Principals and Applications for National Security
(Norwood, MA: ARTECH House, 2007), 5; Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Carlisle
Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004),17; Carl, The International Dictionary of
Intelligence, 97.
23

Caddell, Deception 101, 17.
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consensus among a nation’s population, military and leaders not easily undermined by an
adversary’s psychological warfare measures.
LEGAL WARFARE
Legal warfare (or “lawfare”) uses domestic and international law to claim the “legal high
ground” to assert Chinese interests. Lawfare is designed to justify China’s actions as
legally valid and cement psychological efforts to create doubts among adversary, neutral military
and civilian authorities, and in the broader international community about the justification of an
opponent’s actions. Instruments of lawfare include domestic legislation, international legislation,
judicial law, legal pronouncement, law enforcement and legal education – all of which can be
used separately or in combination to inform and shape lawfare operations such as legal
deterrence and the imposition or rejection of sanctions.24
Legal warfare reflects both traditional Chinese and Marxist perspectives that law should
serve as an ideological instrument of politics. The CCP has always viewed law as an instrument
of governance, but not as one that places any constraints upon the Party. In this instrumentalist
view, law is a tool to be applied toward a given end, such as achieving higher military and
national security objectives. From the Chinese perspective, legal warfare focuses on attaining
some previously determined objective while allowing the CCP to retain the political initiative in
any dispute.25

24

Office of the Secretary of Defense, China: The Three Warfares, 28; 30.

25

Dean Cheng, Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare, Backgrounder No. 2692, Heritage Foundation,
May 18, 2012, 3; 6; file:///C:/Users/v_coc/Downloads/bg2692%20(2).pdf, accessed August 27, 2020.
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Influence Operations, Information Operations, and Political Warfare
Influence operations are anchored in the informational instrument of national power. The
concept of power in international relations is often viewed as the possession of some set of
capabilities or instruments – diplomatic, informational, military, or economic – that allow a
nation to achieve its objectives in relation to other nations or non-state actors.26 Information is
data presented in context to inform or provide meaning for action.27 Informational power refers
to a nation’s ability to organize, process, and integrate information for decision making, and to
communicate its intent and views to shape the external (or internal) environment in ways that
support its national objectives.28
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Current U.S. military doctrine defines information operations as the use of informationrelated capabilities to “influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries
while protecting [one’s] own.”29 This definition indicates that influence is an effect of
information operations, designed to produce a desired outcome or end state on a given target

26

Vladisov B. Sotirovíc, “What is Power in International Relations?,” OrientalReview.org, May 18, 2020,
https://orientalreview.org/2020/05/18/what‐is‐power‐in‐international‐relations/, accessed August 21, 2020. This
is the familiar DIME model and is not necessarily inclusive of all elements of national power. For instance, Sotirovíc
also identified natural resources, population resources, and geographical features as additional elements of
national power. Herman argued that a nation’s intelligence capabilities also constitute an element of national
power. Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
esp. 379‐385.
27

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, Joint Publication 3‐13 (Washington, DC: 2014), I‐3;
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_13.pdf; accessed May 11, 2020. Hereinafter Joint
Pub 3‐13. Hereinafter Joint Pub 3‐13.
28

Commander Jeff Farlin, “Instruments of National Power: How America Earned Independence,” Strategy Research
Project, U.S. Army War College, 2014, 5; https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/87.pdf, accessed August
21, 2020. This is a good, short study of application of the DIME model of national power in a specific historical
context.
29

Joint Pub 3‐13, ix.
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audience. Influence operations attack the cognitive dimension of the information environment,
which encompasses
the minds of those who transmit, receive, and respond to or act on information. It refers
to individuals’ or groups’ information processing, perception, judgment, and decision
making. These elements are influenced by many factors, to include individual or cultural
beliefs, norms, vulnerabilities, motivations, emotions, experiences, morals, education,
mental health, identities, and ideologies….[The cognitive] dimension constitutes the most
important dimension of the information environment.30
Potential target audiences in the cognitive dimension may include “an individual leader,
members of a decision- making group, military organizations and personnel, specific population
subgroups, or a mass public.”31
While Chinese information operations doctrine reflects PLA study of U.S. experience and
doctrine, 32 there is at least one significant difference in approach. Whereas U.S. policy and
doctrine limit information operations to activities conducted during military operations,33 the
Chinese view is far more aggressive. From the Chinese perspective, information operations are
constant and ongoing, whether in wartime or peacetime and are better viewed as information

30

Ibid, I‐3. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect,
process, disseminate, or act on information (I‐1). In addition to the cognitive dimension, the information
environment also includes the physical dimension and the informational dimension. The physical dimension is
composed of command and control (C2) systems, key decision makers, and supporting infrastructure that enable
individuals and organizations to create effects (I‐2). The informational dimension encompasses where and how
information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and protected (I‐3).
31

Linda Robinson et al., Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2018, 2;
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1772/RAND_RR1772.pdf, accessed
August 20. 2020.
32

Larry M. Wortzel, The Chinese People’s Army and Information Warfare (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 20140, 1; https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2263.pdf,
accessed 27 August 2020.
33

Joint Pub 3‐13, ix; Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Directive 3600.01, Information
Operations, May 4, 2017; https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/360001p.pdf,
accessed 21 August 2020.
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warfare (xinxi zhanzheng).34 Concerning China’s peacetime conduct of influence operations, the
U.S. Department of Defense 2019 Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China, found that China
conducts influence operations against media, cultural, business, academic, and policy
communities of the United States, other countries, and international institutions to
achieve outcomes favorable to its security and international objectives. The Chinese
Communist Party seeks to condition foreign and multilateral political establishments and
public opinion to accept China’s narrative surrounding its [strategic] priorities.35
Chinese influence operations include the conduct of clandestine human intelligence
operations to identify and develop agents of influence. Agents of influence are persons who are
manipulated by a foreign intelligence service to use their public or private positions to influence
public opinion or decision making in a manner that will advance the objectives of that service’s
government. 36 China predominantly focuses on establishing and maintaining power brokers
within foreign governments to promote policies consistent with Chinese interests. China also
employs Chinese citizens living abroad or ethnic Chinese citizens of other countries to advance
its national objectives, often through coercion or blackmail.37
The broad scope of Chinese influence operations is consistent with the Chinese concept
of “information deterrence.” Information deterrence is the ability to influence decision makers
and the public of one’s own country, those of an opponent, or third parties. This includes not
only affecting the flow of information, but also having the ability to provide one’s own

34

Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge,” 2.

35

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress,112.

36

Carl, International Dictionary of Intelligence, 11.

37

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, 112.
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information and narrative to develop political support to legitimate one’s actions and sway
international opinion.38
POLITICAL WARFARE
The scope and nature of China’s peacetime influence operations also marks them as a
type of political warfare. Political warfare is a term not well-established in U.S. usage and
doctrine, “but one that seems useful for describing a spectrum of overt and covert activities
designed to support [the accomplishment] of national political-military objectives.”39 The 19th
Century Prussian soldier-scholar Carl von Clausewitz defined war as the “continuation of policy
by other means,” an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” clearly distinguishable
from other means of political intercourse by the measured use of violence in pursuit of national
interests.40 George F. Kennan, writing at the beginning of the Cold War in 1948, characterized
political warfare as “the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace.”
In [its] broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s
command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and
covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures…and
“white” propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of “friendly” foreign
elements, “black” psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance
in hostile states.41

38

Timothy R. Heath, Kristen Gunnes, and Cortez A. Cooper, The PLA and China’s Rejuvenation: National Security
and Military Strategies, Deterrence Concepts, and Combat Capabilities (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2012), 46; 57; file:///C:/Users/v_coc/Downloads/RAND_RR1402%20(1).pdf, accessed August 21, 2020.
39

Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett, eds., Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the US
Approach (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989), xi.
40

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1976), 87.
41

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945‐1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Community, Policy Planning
Staff Memorandum, “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare,” Document No. 269;
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945‐50Intel/d269, accessed 20 August 2020.
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Subsequent efforts to conceptualize or further refine the definition of political warfare have
tended to focus on means – propaganda, psychological operations, guerilla warfare – rather than
ends.42 The authors of a recent RAND Corporation study of contemporary political warfare
practices defined political warfare as
the intentional use of one or more of the implements of power (diplomatic, information,
military, and economic) to affect the political composition or decision-making within a
state. Political warfare is often—but not necessarily—carried out covertly, but must be
carried out outside the context of traditional war.43
This definition of political warfare is largely consistent with the concept of “unrestricted
warfare,” first publicly introduced by PLA Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui in 1999.
The essence of unrestricted warfare is the use of all available means “including armed force or
non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the
enemy to accept one’s interests.” In unrestricted warfare, the barriers between peacetime and
wartime, and between military forces and the civilian population, are fundamentally erased.
Methods of unrestricted warfare may include
environmental warfare, financial warfare, trade warfare, cultural warfare, and legal
warfare [as well as] assassinating financial speculators to safeguard a nation’s financial
security, setting up slush funds to influence opponents’ legislatures and governments,
and buying controlling shares of stocks to convert an adversary’s major television and
newspapers outlets into tools of media warfare.44

42

Linda Robinson et al., Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2018, 2‐6;
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1772/RAND_RR1772.pdf, accessed
August 20. 2020. As the authors point out, “Political warfare never fit neatly in American strategic dialogue” (2).
43

Ibid., 7.

44

David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “A New Generation of Unrestricted Warfare,” War on the Rocks, August 19,
2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/a‐new‐generation‐of‐unrestricted‐warfare/, accessed August 20, 2020.
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In the parlance of the PLA, political warfare is referred to as “liaison work,” an
association that is deeply entrenched and dates back to the Chinese Revolution.45 The purpose of
military liaison work is to “amplify or attenuate the political effect of the military instrument of
national power.”46 According to the PLA’s September 2010 “Political Work Guidelines,”
military liaison work entails:
Establishing military liaison work policies and regulations, organizing and executing
Taiwan work; researching and studying foreign military situations; leading All-Army
enemy disintegration work; in conjunction with relevant [Central Military Committee
Functional Organs], organizing and leading psychological warfare education and training,
and technology and equipment development; guiding and executing border negotiation
political work and external military propaganda work; assuming responsibility for
relevant International Red Cross liaison and military-related overseas Chinese work.47
Role of the PLA
Initially referred to as the “Red Army” under Mao Zedung the PLA, with which the
“Three Warfares” concept is most strongly associated, is first and foremost, the military arm of
the CCP. Unlike a national army dedicated to the defense of a state and its people, the PLA’s
purpose is to create political power for the Party. As Mao stated, and as contemporary Chinese
political leaders continue to believe, “The Red Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting,
but in order to…help [the masses, i.e., the Party] establish revolutionary political power.”48
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The PLA is the ultimate guarantor of the Party’s power and its principal means of
achieving its international security objectives, and is tasked with shaping the international and
regional security environments in ways conducive to the realization of the Party’s goals.49 In his
work report to the 19th Congress of the CCP in October 2017, Chairman Xi Jinping called on
the PLA to “prepare for military struggle in all strategic directions” and said the PLA was
integral in achieving China’s “rejuvenation” as a great power.50
As the Party’s army, the PLA is organizationally part of the CCP’s political apparatus.
The Central Military Commission (CMC), the PLA’s highest decision-making body, is
technically both a Party organ subordinate to the CCP Central Committee and a government
office appointed by the National People’s Congress. While staffed almost exclusively by military
officers, the CMC Chairman is a civilian who usually serves concurrently as the CCP General
Secretary and as China’s President.51 (All three posts are currently held by Xi Jinping.) The PLA
conducts influence operations through “functional organs” directly subordinate to the CMC,
elements of the PLA Strategic Support Force, and PLA-controlled media outlets.
CMC FUNCTIONAL ORGANS
In 2015, the CMC underwent significant reorganization, replacing four General
Departments that previously managed the PLA with 15 CMC departments and offices.52
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Within this new organizational structure, thee organizations directly subordinate to the CMC the Joint Staff Department, the Political Work Department, and the Office for International
Military Cooperation – are likely to have responsibilities for the conduct of influence operations.
Joint Staff Department
The Joint Staff Department (JSD, formerly the General Staff Department) is responsible
for formulating overall PLA strategy and requirements, operational planning, and providing
command and control support to PLA forces. The JSD Intelligence Bureau (formerly Second
Bureau, GSD) conducts overt and clandestine human intelligence operations (which may include
influence agent operations), manages the PLA defense attaché system, provides indications and
warning and other analysis to the CMC leadership, and manages intelligence produced by
dedicated PLA reconnaissance assets.53
The Intelligence Bureau also controls several think tanks, such as the China Institute for
International and Strategic Studies and the China Foundation for International Strategic Studies,
both for research and to interact with foreign analysts. In addition, the Intelligence Bureau has
used academic fronts for operational intelligence purposes, suggesting the existence of a broader
network that could be used for covert influence.54
A second JSD-subordinate organization, designated Unit 61398, provides
communications intelligence (COMINT) support to political warfare and influence operations.
The unit, known to have been involved in cyber espionage directed against U.S. firms, is capable
of intercepting email exchanges, computer files, call phone calls, and text messaging of targets
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on Taiwan, in the United States, and elsewhere, yielding valuable information for assessment of
potential candidates for recruitment in influence operations conducted by the Intelligence Bureau
or the Political Work Department (see below). Unit 61398 reportedly maintains a database on
military officers from Taiwan, and presumably other foreign nations, with the rank of colonel or
above. Profiles are update semi-monthly and include such basic information as date and place of
birth, education, personal habits, family information, and current location.55
Political Work Department
The Political Work Department (PWD), the successor organization to the CMC General
Political Department (GPD) is primarily responsible for “Party building in the military,
organization work, political education, and military human resources management.”56 The PWD
Liaison Bureau (PWD/LB, formerly the GPD Liaison Department, or GPD/LD), is the PLA’s
principal organization responsible for political warfare. The PWD/LB functions as an
“interlocking directorate that operates at the nexus of politics, finance, military operations, and
intelligence [and which] was few analogous counterparts in modern democratic societies.”57
While there is little publicly available information concerning the structure of the PWD/LB
following the 2015 CMC reorganization, it probably continues to execute most of the functions
previously associated with the GPD/LD. These include influence operations focused on Taiwan,
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“friendly contact,” border defense, propaganda, and further development of the “Three
Warfares” concept.
PWD/LB Taiwan-focused influence operations are intended to create and exploit
political, cultural, or social frictions within Taiwan, and to undermine trust between politicalmilitary authorities on Taiwan and U.S. policymakers. The principal vehicle for Taiwan-focused
“liaison work” is the China Association for Promoting Chinese Culture (CAPCC). Established in
2001 as a propaganda vehicle, CAPCC has subordinate sections for academic research and
exchanges, and has regularly participated in cross-Strait cultural forums since 2006. CAPCC also
manages at least two commercial enterprises, the Huayi Audi-Visual Company and Huayi
Publishing. The Huayi Audio-Visual Company has collaborated with Taiwanese counterparts on
movie production, student exchanges, and expositions. CAPCC also appears to have close
relationships with both the Hong Kong-based China Review News and the PLA Academy of
Military Sciences.58
“Friendly contact” entails establishing and exploiting relationships with foreign military,
political, economic, and academic elites. The principal PWD/LB vehicle for friendly contact is
the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC), established in 1984. CAIFC’s
major function is to establish and maintain rapport with senior foreign defense and security
elites, to include senior retired military officers and legislators. One CAIFC project, the Sanya
Initiative, was a multiyear program to bring retired senior U.S. generals and admirals to China to
meet with their retired PLA counterparts. The goal of the Sanya Initiative was to soften U.S.
military attitudes toward China and influence the U.S. to reduce arms sales to Taiwan. American
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participants were reportedly encouraged to return home and meet with active duty military leads
to share what they had learned on the trip.59
CAIFC also provides foreign participants with entrée to the Chinese business community,
probably in return for their support of Chinese policy positions. On at least one occasion, CAIFC
reportedly required a senior retired non-U.S. military officer to agree to publish editorials critical
of U.S. regional policy in return for business development support in China.60
The PWD/LB is likely to have inherited the role of the GPD/LD Border Defense Bureau
in influencing border negotiations and agreements. China has a land boundary of 22,000
kilometers with 14 states, to include Russia, North Korea, India, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Many
of these border areas are home to ethnic minorities who, from China’s perspective, are a
potential source of domestic unrest and international dispute. “Liaison work” in this context may
include managing a network of border meeting sites, cross-border intelligence collection and
propaganda operations, and emergency management of border issues.61
The PWD/LB has also probably also taken on the responsibilities of the former GPD/LD
External Propaganda Bureau, the PLA’s principal staff department for applied psychological
warfare and propaganda. This would give the PWD/LB an important role in furthering
development of the “Three Warfares” concept through association with the neo-Maoist
Dongfang Yi Cultural Expansion Association. In 2009, Dongfang Yi established a Future Media
Research Lab at Tsinghua University’ School of Journalism and Communications as a means of
competing for international public opinion. An active proponent of legal warfare, Dongfang Yi
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has also established a Military Law Research Center with the China Political University’s
International Exchange Center.62
Office for International Military Cooperation
The CMC Office of International Military Cooperation is mainly responsible for
managing PLA “international military exchanges and cooperation” as well as “managing and
coordinating the work of the armed forces related to foreign affairs.” 63 PLA engagements with
foreign military forces focus on building political ties and influence, particularly in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America. Engagement activities provide the PLA with opportunities to demonstrate
China’s growing military capabilities, enhance China’s image abroad, and further China’s
diplomatic objectives. Visits by senior PLA officers to foreign countries are particularly
important to shaping China’s image abroad. During visits to the U.S., for example, senior PLA
officers often use formal speeches or other events to deliver messaging consistent with Chinese
defense and security interests.64
International military cooperation also includes advancing Chinese foreign relations
through personal contacts and military assistance programs, to include military education
programs. Many Latin American and Caribbean countries, for instance, send officers to the
strategic-level College of Defense Studies at China’s National Defense University. Some of
these countries also send officers to other PLA schools.65
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PLA STRATEGIC SUPPORT FORCE
Established in December 2015, the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) is “a new type of
combat force for safeguarding national security and an important driver for the growth of new
combat capabilities. It comprises supporting forces for battlefield environment, information,
communications, information security, and new technology testing.” 66 The SSF’s Network
Systems Division is responsible for strategic-level information operations, and integrates the
PLA’s capabilities for cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare in a single force. The SSF
was built around existing operational units and organizations from PLA CMC departments and
incorporates the 311 Base (Unit 61716, formerly subordinate to the General Political
Directorate).67
The 311 Base, headquartered in Fuzhou, Fujian Province, is the only PLA organization
publicly known to focus on psychological warfare. The Base has at least six subordinate
regiments responsible for targeting public opinion on Taiwan through network operations,
television, audiovisual productions, and radio broadcasting. The 311 Base’s commercial persona
is the China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation, whose primary broadcasting channel is the Voice
of the Taiwan Strait.68
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PLA MEDIA OUTLETS
The PLA also plays an active role in media warfare. The PLA controls a large publishing
empire, including numerous publishing houses and several newspapers to include the largecirculation PLA Daily. These publishing outlets employ or give voice to a number of PLA
officers who are talented propagandists and who possess a flair for belligerent language that
attracts attention both domestically and abroad, where international media picks up their remarks
and presents them as China’s” official policy. 69
Conclusion
Reflecting both a long tradition in Chinese strategic thought and its own historical
development and role as the armed wing of the CCP, the PLA conducts influence operations to
maintain and expand the Party’s “revolutionary political power.” The “Three Warfares” concept
provides the CCP and the PLA with a flexible, and potentially powerful and effective means of
leveraging aspects of Chinese informational power to gain and maintain fluence over both
external and internal target audiences. Because PLA information operations doctrine recognizes
no clear distinction between peacetime and wartime, the “Three Warfares” may be
contextualized as an ongoing form of both information warfare and political warfare primarily
intended to achieve Chinese national security objectives by means short of armed conflict.
During an armed conflict, the PLA could be expected to continue influence operations, both
offensively to effect adversary decision making, political relationships, public morale, and
military operations, and defensively to counter adversary influence operations. The PLA could
also be expected to continue influence operations during a post-conflict scenario, both in support
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of diplomatic efforts to achieve an outcome most favorable to Chinese interests and to bolster
CCP internal controls.
Chinese influence operations offer a wealth of opportunities for further research. Key
research questions include:


What is the role of other executors – the United Work Front Department, the Propaganda
Ministry, and the Ministry of State – in Chinese influence operations? How are their
activities executed and controlled?



The development of historical case studies of Chinese employment of influence
operations. What was the role of the PLA and other executors? What were the results?



How have Taiwan, the United States, and other nations responded to Chinese influence
operations? How should they respond? What challenges do democratic governments face
in developing countermeasures to Chinese or other foreign influence activities?
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